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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN
LABOR DISPUTES
STIMSON BULLITT*T HIS ARTICLE will discuss the labor dispute section of the Washington
State Unemployment Compensation Act1 and especially the advan-
tages of an insurance coverage test as the most satisfactory approach
by which this section may be applied.
The United States levies a tax on employers (with specified excep-
tions) of eight or more persons of .3 per cent (after credits) of the
payroll.2 Part of the proceeds of this tax is used as a subsidy for the
total administrative costs of the unemployment compensation system
of every state, and part is held as a back log for state funds to make
advances to them when they run low.
The state of Washington levies a similar payroll tax of up to 2.7
per cent on all employers (with specified exceptions).' This tax, in
effect, is an insurance premium to protect against the risks of short-
term unemployment. The receipts are kept in a fund administered by
the State Employment Security Department.
Each employer is allowed a tax credit based on the relationship
('experience rating") which the degree of payroll fluctuations over
the preceding three years bears to the fluctuations of all payrolls
within the state system.' The more stable the payroll the larger the
credit. The maximum credit theoretically possible is 1.08 per cent of
the year's payroll, or a reduction of about one-third in the full
amount of taxes to be paid into the state and federal unemployment
compensation funds.
After his first week of unemployment, a worker covered by the
plan may receive benefits from the state fund. Depending upon the
total wages he has earned the preceding year, he may receive from
$10 to $25 per week during his unemployment for a period of from
fifteen to twenty-six weeks."
A worker is declared ineligible for benefits for five weeks if the
cause of his unemployment was his misconduct, his voluntary quit
* Member Washington Bar.1 Wash Laws 1945, c. 35, § 77; REa. REv. STAT. § 9998-215 (Supp. 1945).
249 STAT. 639 (1935), 53 STAT. 183, 1387 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 1600, 1601 (1944).2 Wash. Laws 1949, c. 214, § 18; REm. REv. STAT. § 9998-227 Supp. 1949).
4 Wash. Laws 1949, c. 235, § 3; RPm. R . STAT. § 9998-246b Supp. 1949).
5 Wash. Laws 1949, c. 214, § 16; RPm. Rav. STAT. § 9998-218 (Supp. 1949).
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without good cause, or his refusal to accept work not unsuitable; also
he is disqualified for a year for misrepresenting his claim.6 If the un-
employment is due to a labor dispute work stoppage, the disqualifica-
tion lasts for the duration of the stoppage.'
FUNCTIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
The primary aim of unemployment compensation is to alleviate
hardship suffered by industrial workers and their families during
periods of unemployment. This is done by spreading the risks. Second-
ary purposes are the promotion of stable employment and labor
mobility and the maintenance of consumer purchasing power.
The unemployment compensation systems are not directed at the
deep troughs of the business cycle. An insurance plan is financially
inadequate to protect against such a risk, and a cash dole has been
discredited as unsound public policy. Other remedies are more appro-
priate for long-term mass unemployment. The unemployment com-
pensation systems are designed to insure the risk of short-term un-
employment due to such causes as moderate fluctuations in business
activity, breakdown of machinery, retooling, taking inventory, lack
of orders, finances, raw materials, or shipping facilities.8
All of the unemployment compensation acts embody the experience
rating principle for several reasons: to encourage employers to main-
tain stable employment by the offer of a tax incentive; to assess the
premiums according to the degree of risk as between industries and
as between competitors within an industry; to encourage employers
to police the system; and to maintain the fund at about the same size
by adjustment of the rate of flow in and out-i.e., when the payments
of benefits increase, the experience ratings go down and there is a
consequent increase in premium rates.
Experience rating involves the problem of relating; the burden of
contributions to responsibility for causing unemployment. The payroll
tax is based on an assumption that unemployment is connected with
business operations and thus that unemployment costs should be borne
by business as a whole. And it is assumed that the particular tax-
paying unit is in part responsible, for its employees' short-term un-
employment of the sort covered by unemployment insurance.
6 Wash. Laws 1949, c. 214, §§ 12-15; RIZ!. Rxv. STAT. §§9998-211-214 (Supp. 1949).
7 1 supra.8 Marsile J. Hughes, Principles Underlying Labor-Dispute Disqualification 1, At-
tachrnent to Unemployment Compensation Letter No. 000.
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Prior to July 31, 1949, the experience rating was not affected by a
payroll decline due to a labor dispute stoppage. This exception has
been removed.9 The change is in line with the view that the effects of
such a stoppage (upon the economy, not upon the employees) are part
of the cost of the business and to be borne as such, like other causes
of short-term unemployment or like industrial accidents. The new
rule bears no logical relationship to the fund. There is no actuarial
basis for reducing the experience rating for a cause which takes nothing
from the fund. The ground for the change (if not merely inadvertent)
was to remove the pressure of temptation to bring about a labor dis-
pute stoppage when a payroll reduction is planned, in order to avoid
the drop in experience rating and to reduce the incentive to resist the
payment of benefits to employees where there is an issue of a labor
dispute stoppage as the cause of their unemployment.
THE LABOR DISPUTE DIsQuAIFCATION
In the decisions by commissioners and courts which have applied
the labor dispute disqualification, there have been sharp conflicts of
rationale, although there has not been a striking diversity of results.
One source of confusion is that the fields of organized labor and social
insurance are so new in this country that they have not yet acquired
a set of legal concepts of their own; therefore transplanted images are
applied to functions and relationships in these fields, and the reflection
which they supply is cloudy or distorted.
But a greater cause of confusion has been the conflict of beliefs as
to the legislative purpose of the Act and of this disqualifying section:
§ 77 LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION. An individual shall be disqualified
for benefits for any week with respect to which the Commissioner finds that
his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a
labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is
or was last employed: Provided, That this section shall not apply if it is
shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that
(a) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the
labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and
(b) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, imme-
diately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members
employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are
participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute: Provided,
That if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly con-
ducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted as separate
9 Note 4 supra.
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departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the pur-
poses of this subdivision, be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment,
or other premises.1 0
The main conflict has arisen between the theories of "volition" or
"blame" and that of "insurance coverage"-whether eligibility is to
depend upon whether the claimant's behavior merits a reward or
whether the circumstances are such that the claimant is covered by the
terms of the insurance policy.
It may be that the act as a whole should be freely interpreted, but
Section 77 demands a strict construction. The tests based on volition
or moral blame are subjective and indeterminate as applied to systems
of social insurace, while the test of insurance coverage 1 permits greater
certainty and more precise obedience to the terms of the section and
to the legislative intent. This test is the objective measurement, beside
the terms of Section 77, of the circumstances of individual and group
action, drained of descriptive coloration of legality, morality, motive,
or free choice.2
In this country there is no federal act except for the taxing statute,
and there are no records of debate which might throw light on the
legislative intent behind Section 77. But the American acts are derived
from the British, and most of them, including the Washington act, are
modeled closely on the revised British act. 8 The discussion in Parlia-
ment of the bill which became the National Insurance Act of 1911
indicated an intent to insure against "fluctuations in trade." The rea-
sons given for the British theory were the belief that the state should
remain impartial in specific labor disputes and that the actuarial risk
should be limited. By this theory, the merits of the dispute or the
parties to it have no bearing; the question is merely whether the
situation is covered by the terms of the insurance. And it has been
thus construed.1
1o Note 1 supra,
11 Insurance: A contract to compensate another for a loss upon occurrence of a
specified contingent event.
12 "This is one of the oldest fallacies of the law. The difference between the two is
the difference between an act and no act. The distinction is well settled in the parallel
instance of duress by threats, as distinguished from overmastering physical force applied
to a man's body and imparting to it the motion sought to be attributed to him. In the
former case there is a choice and therefore an act." Holmes, J., Eliza Lines; 199 U.S.
129, 133 (1905).
Is 10-11 GEo V c. 30 (1920) ; 14-15 Gao. V, c. 30 (1924) ; 25 GEo. V, c. 8 (1935);
9-10 Gao. VI, c. 67 (1946). The labor dispute section of the acts of the many states,
including Washington, is modeled on S.S.B. "DRAnt Bii4" § 5 (d).14 "It is important, therefore, to ascertain the construction placed upon the British
acts in construing our own. For it is a general rule of statutory construction that a
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CONSTRUCTION
The terms of Section 77 embody no requirement of volition.' In this
respect it is inconsistent with the preamble to the Act which speaks of
"involuntary unemployment."'" By the accepted rule of construction
the specific provision may be expected to control as an exception to
the general rule.'
In the same way, Section 77 properly stands alone in respect to the
four other grounds for disqualification, all of which are based upon
volition."8 The five grounds for disqualification-voluntary quit, mis-
conduct, misrepresentation, refusal to work, labor dispute-are listed
in consecutive sections in the Act. But Section 77 is sharply inconsistent
with the others and demands a different approach for its application."
For example, "good cause" applies to "voluntary quit" but not to
Section 77, which is not conditioned upon blame or choice. These two
sections of the Act give recognition to the marked difference between
an individual quit and a collective work stoppage which does not
bring to an end the employment relationship. Confusion comes from
failure to recognize the distinction drawn by the legislature between
idleness as a bargaining tool and idleness for its own sake.
There are more economic, social, and psychological pressures brought
to bear upon the decision to undertake a work stoppage in the course
statute adopted from another state or country is presumed to have been taken with the
construction there placed upon it." In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wn. (2d) 204,
208; 130 P.(2d) 64 (1942).
'5 Midvale Co. v. U.C. Bd. of Rev., 165 Pa. Super. 359, 67 A. (2d) 380 (1949).
16 ".. . for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserve to be used for the
benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and that this act shall be
liberally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and suffering
caused thereby to the minimum." REm. REY. STAT. § 9998-102 (Supp. 1940) [P.P.C. §
923-3].
'7 In re North River Logging Co., note 14 supra; Midvale Co. v. U. C. Bd. of Rev.,
note 15 supra; "Any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legislation must
therefore be narrowly construed." Aragon v. U.C.C., 149 F.(2d) 447, 449 (C.C.A.
9th 1945), quoting from Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945).
18 § 12 ".... An individual who has left work voluntarily without good cause shall
be disqualified. . . ." § 13 ". . . An individual who has been discharged or suspended
for misconduct connected with his work shall be disqualified ... ." § 14 ". . . An indi-
vidual shall be disqualified for benefits for the calendar week with respect to which he
has willfully made a false statement or representation or willfully failed to report a
material fact to obtain any benefits under the provisions of this act and for the fifty-two
next following weeks." § 15 ". . . An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, if the
Commissioner finds that he has failed without good cause, either to apply for available,
suitable work . . . or to accept suitable work when offered him, or to return to his
customary self-employment (if any) ......
19 In re Employees Pac. T. & T. Co., 31 Wn. (2d) 659, 198 P. (2d) 675 (1948,
en banc, unanimous), in holding that section 78 (suitable work factors) did not apply
to section 77, the court declared that section 77 "sets up one item of disqualification for
benefits. It is titled 'Labor Dispute Disqualification.' It is separate and distinct from the
other sections."
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of collective bargaining than there are for an individual quit. One's
range of choice on a specific issue continues to grow even more narrow
with the tendency to conduct collective bargaining on an ever widening
scale."0 If volition is to be used as the basis for applying Section 77,
where the chance to make a choice is more constricted than in the situa-
tions for which the other disqualifying sections provide, then, to be
consistent with these others and to be fair, the claimant should be
allowed to show "good cause." But to do so would nullify Section 77
because then all cases could be solved under other sections. Yet if
Section 77 were removed from the act, the "voluntary quit" provision
would have no rational application to labor dispute stoppages because
the meaning of "voluntary" is indeterminate in respect to them. And
even by its own rationale, the "voluntary quit" provision does not apply
to those disqualified by the terms of Section 77 who took no action
whatever, either as individuals or through a union.
Another contrast between the foundations of Section 77 and other
disqualifications is that a job vacancy due to a labor dispute is "un-
suitable work" for an individual claimant who consequently ihay draw
benefits despite his refusal to enter the vacancy,2' yet the same stop-
page, under the terms of Section 77, disqualifies the group which it
throws out of work.
The relief provision of Section 77 indicates a legislative intent to
make the disqualification far reaching, since it permits payment of
benefits to persons who have no interest or concern with the dispute
but who would be disqualified but for the relief provision. Such exten-
sive scope suggests that the purpose of the section is not that it be a
repetition of one of the voluntary act disqualifications and not a
penalty, but that it merely designate an uninsured risk.
An inarticulate premise of moral blame seems to underlie some of the
decisions which have applied to this section. 2 In the minds of many as
they approach Section 77 is a remnant of the Aiglo-Saxon belief that
20 .... It is always to the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of
two evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude
duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly so called." Holmes, J., Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918).
21 ... . no work shall be deemed to be suitable.... If the position offered is vacant
due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute. . . " Wash. Laws 1945, c. 35,§ 79a; REm. Rv. STAT. § 9998-217a (Supp. 1945).2 2 Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co .. Minn ........ 38 .W. (2d) 223 (1949
McKinley v. Calif. Empl. Stab. Comm ........ Cal ........ 209 P:(2d) 602 (1949);
Bunny's Waffle Shop v. Cal. E. Comm., 24 Cal. (2d) 735, 151 P.(2d) 224 (1944);
Queener v. Magnet Mills, 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S.W. (2d). 1 (1942) ; Bd. of Rev. v. Hix,
126 W. Va. 538, 29 S.E. (2d) 618 (1944).
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in any dispute at least one party is morally wrong, and justice decrees
that he be made to suffer. There is a hint of the early treatment of a
strike as a criminal conspiracy, and an attitude that benefits are com-
pulsory wages, a penalty imposed upon the employer; that a man out
of a job is not entitled to receive work benefits unless he enters the
Employment Security office with clean hands; that the claim for
benefits is a suit against the employer for a liquidated sum. When
management has not been negligent and its conduct has been a model
of rectitude, the commissioners and courts are reluctant to allow bene-
fits regardless of the precise limits of the pattern of eligibility under
the Act.
The provisions for misconduct, misrepresentation, "good cause,"
and suitability of work involve personal responsibility and the merits
of the claimant's position. By contrast, Section 77, by its terms, dis-
qualifies all those within its scope regardless of their "innocence" and
without regard to whether the stoppage may have been brought about
by the unlawful act of management or some third party.
The section concerning exceptions to "suitable work" provides that
a job vacancy due to a labor dispute is not "suitable work."2 The
inference is that it is not improper conduct (fault) to be unemployed
as a result of such dispute. Certain types of stoppages (economic
strikes) have been expressly sanctioned by national legislation since
1935.14 The good-man-bad-man approach is of dubious value as a tool
for the solution to current problems of industrial employment and it
stands in contradiction to the terms of Section 77.
The unemployment compensation systems were not established as
a substitute for any former procedure. But even the workmen's com-
pensation systems, established to replace the procedure of personal
injury suits by servant against master, retain no element of fault on
the part of either party.
Although its effect as a standard of interpretation is not as important
as the concepts of volition or fault, the "neutrality of the State" theory
is held by some." The state cannot be neutral as to eligibility in labor
disputes. Whichever choice was made, one side would be assisted."
To omit the disqualification would increase the relative bargaining
s Note 21 supra.
2449 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 163 (1947).25 Matson Terminals v. Cal. E. Comm., 24 Cal. (2d) 695, 151 P.(2d) 202, 209
(1944).
26 "The withholding of unemployment compensation in such cases is a help to the
industry, just as the payment of compensation is an aid to labor." Boyertown Burial
Casket Co. v. U.C. Bd., 162 Pa. Super. 98, 56 A.(2d) 390, 392 (1948).
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power of labor. Its inclusion is a positive advantage to managementinasmuch as while unemployed due to a labor dispute work stoppage
employees suffer loss of wage credit for unemployment compensation,
and to those employees, otherwise eligible for benefits under the relief
provision, there is an incentive to refrain from taking any positive
part in the dispute. The state can be impartial toward specific contro-
versies, but it no more can be neutral toward the labor-management
relationship than it can toward the community of nations.
The neutrality theory is in conflict with the terms of the section
when the section disqalifies persons who do nothing to assist the prog-
ress of the dispute but do not meet the terms of eligibility under the
relief provision, or where management has acted in breach of obliga-
tion, legal or moral; statutory or contractual. 7 Here the idea of neu-
trality involves a subjective standard by which what is onerous to
one side is fair to the other. It has little meaning when applied to one
who tips the scales, rather than one who holds them.
The patterns of modern industrial life at times allow some people
to be dropped into a condition where they are unable to provide for
their own basic needs. To overcome this problem two policies now
compete: tax-supported grants from public treasuries to those who
prove themselves "needy" by means such as a pauper's oath versus
self-sustaining systems of public insurance whose premiums are paid
by those who are protected and with broad enough coverage to elimi-
nate the necessity under the other scheme for an annual appropriation
of a share of the public budget. The insurance coverage test is in
accord with the latter approach.
CAsEs
The first instance in which the Washington Supreme Court con-
sidered the meaning of Section 77 was In re St. Paul & Tacoma
Lumber Co."' The members of a union local struck when the company
refused to negotiate. Picket lines were established by the strikers, and
all employees, except for some maintenance men, stayed away from
work. Claimant employees were denied benefits as disqualified under
Section 77. A labor dispute was held to exist.29 In accordance with the
27 "We both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of
justice arises only where the pressure of necessity is equal, that the strong take what
they can and the weak grant what they must." THucYiDEs, HISTORY OF THE PELOPOrq-
NESIAN W, , Book V, § 89 fin.
287 Wn. (2d) 580, 110 P.s(2d) 877 (1941, en banc).29 The court declared that there was no basis for distinction between whether or not
negotiations had commenced. The same conclusions could have been reached by the fact
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insurance coverage test, the refusal to negotiate, although an unfair
labor practice, did not affect the operation of the disqualification, as
the merits of the dispute had no bearing.
By the fact of their failure to cross the picket line, the shingle mill
employees-members of a different union from the strikers-were held
tb have failed to meet the no-participation requirement of the relief
provision."0 The labor dispute caused the picket line which in turn
caused the work stoppage. A labor dispute was the cause, even though
secondary, of the work stoppage as to these claimants. Thus they were
disqualified under Section 77. Their failure to act (go to work when
their jobs were available) 8' was a form of negative participation, so
that they were not excepted from the disqualification by the terms of
the relief provision, After recognition of the fact of participation, 2
however, the court went on to base its decision on the voluntary nature
of the claimants' omission rather than on the mere fact of the
omission.3
A man confronted by a picket line between himself and his job is
subject to strong pressures to deter him from crossing it-fear of
possible violence,"' respect for the principles of organized labor," risk
of loss of union membership," terms of union contract,3 7 fear of social
ostracism, risk of liability for tort or crime in case of violence. Follow-
ing a free will construction, a court or commissioner may be called
upon to make a tactical estimate of the picket line and its members,
that the mere existence of the strike, by definition an act in furtherance of a labor dis-
pute, conclusively presumes a labor dispute.30A ccord, Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Emp. Comm., 17 Cal. (2d) 321, 109 P. (2d)
935 (1941); Brown v. Md. U. C. Bd. ...... Md ........ 55 A.(2d) 696 (1947) ; McGann v.
U. C. Bd., 163 Pa. Super. 379, 62 A. (2d) 87 (1948) ; Matson Terminals v. Calif. E.
Comm., 53 Cal. App. (2d) 541, 128 P.(2d) 63 (1942) ; Phillips v. U. C. Bd. of R., 163
Pa. Super. 374, 62 A. (2d) 84 (1948); Stillman v. U. C. Bd., 161 Pa. Super. 569,
56 A.(2d) 380 (1948) ; Aitken v. Bd. of R., 136 N.J.L. 372, 56 A.(2d) 587 (1948).
31 To hold that failure to cross a picket line, if the job behind it were unavailable,
constituted participation would be to make participation out of a failure to perform a
futile act.
32 "By so refusing to work, the persons are adding their strength to the cause of the
strikers, who are then put in a better bargaining position when the entire plant is shut
down than when their branch of it has stopped only a portion of the operations." See
note 28 supra at 595.
33 "The mere fact that the passage through the picket lines was contrary to their
union conviction was not enough to make their refusal involuntary, since they had a
legal right to pass the lines if they so desired." Ibid. at 595.
3 4 it re Employees Pac. T. & T. Co., note 19 supra; McGann v. U. C. Bd., note
30 supra.
35 Baldassaris v. Egan, 135 Conn. 695, 68 A.(2d) 120 (1949) ; Brown v. Md. U. C.
Bd. note 30 supra (forbidden to cross by union constitution) ; In re St. Paul & Tacoma
Lumber Co., note 28 supra.
86 Stillman v. U. C. Bd., note 30 supra.
37 Andreas v. Bates, 14 Wn. (2d) 322, 128 P.(2d) 300 (1942).
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the ferocity of their demeanor, the weight of their clubs. The resolu-
tion of such subjective forces may be avoided by the insurance cover-
age test which merely draws the line between act and no act."8
One month after this decision, in In re Deep River Timber Co.,8"
the court again had occasion to apply Section 77. In this instance
management was not directly involved in the dispute. The NLRB had
certified local A to the company as bargaining agent for the employees.
Clark, a donkey engineer and member of local B whose members were
mingled with those of local A in the logging operations, refused to join
local A at its request, so local A told the company to discharge Clark
or it would call a strike. He was discharged, and as a result and to
compel his reinstatement local B called a strike which caused his re-
instatement. Then local A called a strike for the reason that its mem-
bers refused to work with Clark. Claimants, members of local B,
reported for work but were told there were not enough men to operate.
Claims were made for the period of the second stoppage, and benefits
were denied. In following the universal rule that a jurisdictional dis-
pute is a labor dispute within the meaning of the acte' (aside from the
ss Some of the maintenance men, members of the striking union, continued to work
for some time after the strike began. Their union granted them work permits to go
through the picket lines. They were laid off when work for them ran out, due to the
stoppage. It was held that they failed to meet the no-participation requirement of the
relief provision and thus did not escape disqualification. They were held to have partici-
pated by reason of membership in the striking union and because "the mere fact that
these individuals saw fit to get permits from the union during the strike period showed
that they recognized the existence of the strike." Under the circumstances, they had
little choice but to accept work permits as tickets to enter the plant. What else could
they do? An examination of their alternatives and rights would be futile. It is hard to
say they participated when they were laid off. The same result could have been
reached by resting the decision on the ground of direct interest or membership in the
same grade or class.
Ten of the boommen and rafters, not members of the striking union, were told by
the company not to return to work until called. Eight others were told to report to work"
but refused to cross the picket line. All were disqualified, the ten as "being engaged in
the same work as that of the men who refused to pass through the lines," and thus in
the same grade or class as the eight who participated. This decision uses the "work
classification" criterion of grade or class. Accord, Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S. C. 315, 20
S.E. (2d) 865 (1942) ; Kieckhefer Container Co. v. U.C.C., 125 N.J.L. 52, 13 A. (2d)
646 (1940) ; Auker v. Rev. Bd., 117 Ind. App. 486, 71 N.E. (2d) 629 (1947) ; Members
of Iron Workers' Union v. Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 242, 139 P.(2d) 208 (1943) ; U.C.C.
v. Martin, 228 N.C. 277, 45 S.E. (2d) 385 (1947); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.C.
Bd. of Rev ....... Pa. ....... 68 A. (2d) 393 (1949); this is more widely used than the
other criteria: union affiliation, Queener v. Magnet Mills, 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S.W. (2d)
1 (1942) ; Johnson v. Pratt, supra; Outboard Marine & Mfg. v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523,
87 N.E. (2d) 610 (1949) ; Copen v. Hix, 43 S.E. (2d) 382 (W. Va. 1947) ("grade or
class" held to be coextensive with jurisdiction of national union) ; prospect of gain,
Queener v. Magnet Mills, supra; see 51 W. VA. L. Q. 137; and the nature of the issues
of the dispute. It appears to be the test followed in Washington. In re Deep River
Timber Co., 8 Wn. (2d) 179, 184, 111 P.(2d) 575 (1941).
9 8 Wn. (2d) 179, 111 P.(2d) 575 (1941).40 Badgett v. Dept. of Ind. Relations, 243 Ala. 538, 10 S. (2d) 880 (1942); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. U. C. Bd. of R., note 38 supra.
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conclusive presumption from the fact of the strike), the court held
that the claimants had participated in the dispute through the agency
of their union local. If the strike had been directed at the employer,
rather than the claimants' union local, they would have met the no-
participation requirement. However, they were held here also to have
been "directly interested" and of the "same grade or class."
In a later case, In re North River Logging Co.,"' the employer in
order to enforce a violation of the terms of the employment contract,
locked out its logging crews for five weeks, during which time the
men were willing and able to work.42 In its decision that a lockout is
a manifestation of a labor dispute (so that benefits were denied) the
court applied the objective test of scope of insurance coverage. Al-
though the result seems unfair from any standpoint, it followed the
law. The decision is consistent with the apparent legislative intent of
the section and is in unison with the cases on this point in other juris-
dictions,"3 except for those states whose statutes expressly exclude a
lockout from their definition of a labor dispute."
In the case of In re Polson Lumber & Shingle Mills," a secondary
boycott which, in effect, was a sympathy strike, was declared to be a
labor dispute at the mills in question. The controversy concerned not
the terms of employment but the policy to be taken by the mills toward
the participants in an entirely separate industrial dispute.
A union local was the bargaining agent for loggers employed by
companies not involved in this case. The loggers struck May 9 and
stayed out five weeks. On May 19 the employers involved here-three
lumber mill companies-entered a union shop agreement with the local,
recognizing it as sole bargaining agent for its employees. On May 22
the local told the mill companies that the logs stored in booms await-
41 Note 14 supra.
42 Since the allowance of tax credit on the basis of experience rating was not em-
bodied in the act until 1947, the purpose of the company in causing the stoppage could
not have been to use the tag of a labor dispute in order to avoid a drop in experience
rating which would result from a shutdown due to some other cause.
43 Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., note 22 mcpra; Midvale Co. v. U. C. Bd. of R.,
note 15 supra; Bankston Creek Collieries v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 77 N.E. (2d) 670
(1948); Adkins v. Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 117 Ind. App. 132, 70 N.E. (2d) 31 (1946),
citing North River case, note 14 supra; Latham v. State U.C.C., 167 Ore. 371, 117
P. (2d) 971 (1941) ; BRITISH UMPiRE, case No. 5117, pp. 364, 365. Rulings by admin-
istrative officers of all states except Md. and those excepting lockout by statute from
disqualification. 1 UIS, 27164 (Prentice-Hall, 1942).
44 PAGE s ORio GEN. CODE ANN., § 1345-6 (d) (Supp. 1948) ; Ky. REv. STAT. 1948,
§ 341, 360 (1); ARK. ST. 1947 ANN., § 81-1106 (d) ; W. VA. 1947 Supp. TO CODE of
1943 ANN., § 2366 (78) (4) ; CONN. GEN. ST. Rxv. of 1949, § 7808 (3) ; Miss. GEN.
LAWS 1944, c. 288, § 1; MINN. M.S.A., § 268.09, subd. 1(6).
45 19 Wn. (2d) 467, 143 P.(2d) 316 (1943).
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ing consumption by the mills were " hot" and that any mill which
undertook to saw them would be declared unfair, with the implication
that work would stop if sawing these logs were begun. The logs had
been cut, rafted, and stored before the start of the loggers' strike.
The union placed pickets on the booms, none of whom was a Mill
employee. The mills sawed the logs in their ponds and then shut
down for the duration of the loggers' strike. There were enough logs
in the booms to have enabled the mills to keep going for the duration
of the loggers' strike. The mill employees made no expression of their
attitude toward this dispute. Their union spokesmen were the only
speakers. The claimants--mill employees--were all members of the
local. Benefits were denied on the ground that claimants were "directly
interested" in the dispute which caused the stoppage. By a test of
chance of gain or loss, the factor of "direct interest" might have been
shown here since the loggers' cause was of such importance to the
strength of the local as a whole. The issue of the dispute bore directly
upon their interests. It was not as though the union had taken up a
minority grievance.
But here the relief provision requirement of lack of participation,
through the agency of the union, would have been even more difficult
to overcome. The leadership of a large union local assisted the cause
of its members engaged in an economic strike in progress at one set
of establishments (logging camps) by enforcing a boycott upon an-
other set of establishments (sawmills) for which the local was bargain-
ing agent. The boycott, which caused the stoppage in question, was
enforced by a threat to call out the employees, on a sympathy strike.
Both the companies and the leadership of the local expected these
employees to be impelled by obedience or loyalty to walk out if so
ordered. The threat was made to stick. Thus claimants participated in
the dispute through the medium of the authority which they permitted
their bargaining agent to exercise.
The usual rule is to some degree, depending on the nature of the
issues of the dispute, to impute to its members the acts of a union
involved in a labor dispute."8 The agency relationship of union mem-
40 Burns v. U. C. Bd. of P., 164 Pa. Super. 470, 65 A. (2d) 445 (1949) ; McKinley
v. Calif. Empi. Stab. Comm., note 22 srupra; Copen v. Hix, note 38 supra; Badgett V.
Dept. of Ind. Rel., note 40 srupra; Prentice v. U. C. Bd. of R., 161 Pa. Super. 630,
56 A. (2d) 295 (1948) ; "The union, then, is agent and attorney for the employees.'...
North Electric Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.(2d) 887, 889 (C.C.A. 6th 1941) ; 29 U.S.C.,
§ 159a; direct interest established by union agency: Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich.
438, 298 N.W. 87, 135 A.L.R. 900 (1941); Chrysler Corp. v. App. Bd., 301 Mich. 351,
3 N.W. (2d) 302 (1942) ; Wasyluk v. Mack Mfg. Corp., 68 A.(2d).264 (N.J. 1949);
Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E. (2d) 625 (1949).
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bership alone may be sufficient to show participation if the union itself
participates as such. The union veil is not pierced to see how or whether
one voted or took a stand in any other manner on the proposed action.
Section 77 is aimed at collective action. The direction taken by the
organized group as such is determinative, without regard to the in-
dividual who may take an independent course. For participation it is
not essential that a union member perform an overt act himself, since
union activities tend to be carried on by officials and committees rather
than by the membership as a whole. Union membership is only evidence
of participation, however, and is not conclusive, its weight depending
on the subject matter of the controversy.
The integration, both horizontal and vertical, of units of labor un-
ions has become developed to the point where, for the problem at hand,
some limits should be put on the agency chain. 7 Section 77 gives no
clue to where the line should be drawn. Where the threat of departure
from the job is not used as a means to cause the stoppage, union mem-
bers should not be held to have taken part in a dispute where the stop-
page is brought about by acts of the leadership of a unit which includes
in its membership persons employed at other establishments as well
as their own.
In Andreas v. Bates," a corporation owned in one area installations
consisting of several units, among which were two sawmills and a
shingle mill. The shingle mill "was a department of the general opera-
tions of the company." It could be operated independently from the
sawmills and other units and often had been so operated. The sawmill
employees were members of one union, and claimants, who worked in
the shingle mill, belonged to another whose contract provided that "no
member of the union shall be required to ... go through a legitimate
picket line." The sawmill workers struck and picketed the entrances
to the area. Claimants did not report for work, apparently unwilling
to cross the picket line. The Commissioner's denial of benefits was
upheld.
If Section 77 is to be applied according to its terms, it did not ex-
clude the claimants from coverage. Their unemployment was due to a
stoppage which existed because of a labor dispute at an establishment
other than the one (shingle mill) where they were last employed, so
47 "But participation by the international union in a labor dispute on behalf of a
local union is not participation of every local represented by the international in such
a local dispute. This would be an unwarranted extension of the principles of agency."
See Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, note 46 supra, at 100.
4s Note 37 supra.
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that the terms of the section 9 did not apply to these claimants who
availed themselves of the clause in their employment contract which
exempted them from the duty to go to work when it entailed crossing
a legitimate picket line. There was no labor dispute "at" the establish-
ment where they were employed."0 The shingle mill was an establish-
ment separate from the sawmills under any one of the commonly used
tests." The personnel policies of the shingle mill were not an issue of
the dispute. The striking union, by placing its pickets before the en-
trances to the whole area, extended its line of attack to the shingle mill.
This was an extension of the stoppage, not of the dispute.
4 ".. . . unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor
dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last
employed."10 Aragon v. U.C.C., 329 U.S. 143 (1946). In contrast to the situation in the Polson
case, where the dispute concerned the policy to be taken toward the loggers' strike by
the establishment where claimants were employed.
53 Geographical isolation, Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N.E. (2d) 390
(1944) ; functional integration whereby the operations of one unit depend upon those
of the other, Spielman v. Ind. Comm., 236 Wis. 240, 295 N.W. 1 (1940); Chrysler
Corp. v. Smith, note 46 supra; Chrysler Corp. v. App. Bd., note 46 supra; or a rule of
thumb or common understanding, Tenn. Coal, Iron v. Martin, 251 Ala. 153, 36 S. (2d)
547 (1948) ; Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining Co .. Md 55 A. (2d)
692 (1947); General Motors Co. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A.(2d. 732 (1947);
"a distinct physical place of business"-construction of term "establishment" in the Faii
Labor Standards Act "as normally used in business and government," Phillips v.
Walling, note 17 supra at 496; "single units," BITISR UMPnm DEc. 1807 (1926), 4943(1936). This was a situation similar to that in the case of Carpenters and Joiners
Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942), where a picket line was set up
in front of one establishment in the course of furthering the progress of a labor dippute
at another establishment.5 2 Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., note 46 supra.
The words of the court (".... the stoppage of work of the shingle weavers ..
indicate a construction of the term "work stoppage" to apply it to the activity of the
employee, while the weight of authority construes the term to refer to operations at the
place of employment. Accord, Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.(2d) 528, 173
A.L.R. 480 (1947) ; Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan U.C.C., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.(2d) 260, 154 A.L.R. 660 (1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 738; Radice v. New Jersey Dept.
of Lab. & Ind., 4 N.J. Super, 364, 67 A. (2d) 313 (1949) ; M. F. Ferst, Ltd. v. Huiet,
78 Ga. App. 855, 52 S.E. (2d) 336 (1949) ; Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, note 51 supra;
Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W. (2d) 689 (1942) ; In re Steelman, 219 N.C.
306, 13 S.E. (2d) 544 (1941); Saunders v. Md. U. C. Bd., 188 Md. 677, 53 A. (2d)
579 (1947); Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp. v. Rev. Bd., 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. (2d)
662 (1947) ; Deshler Broom Factory v. Kenney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N.E. (2d) 332 (1942).
Contra, Bd. of Rev. v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 193 Okla. 36, 141 P.(2d) 69(1943). The general rule is that the term "stoppage" refers to an empty and silent fac-
tory rather than being concerned with an idle group of individuals. This is in accord
with the settled construction given the British Act (1-2 GEo. V, c. 55, § 87, as am. 1924
by § 4 (1), c. 30, 14-15 GEo. V) by the time of enactment of the Washington Act and
those of most of the other states which were modeled on it and which borrowed the
same term. The British Umpire (no court appeal) has held that "stoppage" refers pri-
marily not to cessation of an employee's labor but to stoppage of work at the premises
in consequence of the dispute. Umprnn's DEC., 609, 3809, 4830 (1926), and that for a
stoppage to exist there must be work available which would be done but for the dispute.
BEzNEIT SERas, GEN. Supp. No. 1, B. U. 496. If the term were applied to the employ-
ees rather than to plant operations, the result of this construction would conflict with
the "voluntary quit" section and with the legislative intent in that it might penalize
interminably a person who quit work because of a labor dispute where there was no
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In Wicklund v. Commissioner,"8 the court's concentration on the
equities allowed a hard case to make bad law. Two cases were con-
solidated. The NLRB had certified to the employer logging company
a local of the IWA as exclusive bargaining agent for all employees. A
contract was in force between company and local, governing terms of
employment for all employees. Claimants were trainmen who operated
the company's railroad which carried logs from the company's camps
to its booming grounds. They did not belong to the local but were
members of the Railroad Brotherhoods. They had failed in their at-
tempt to get the NLRB to recognize the Brotherhoods as bargaining
agents for themselves.
In Case No. 1, the local asked claimants to join it. Reluctant to
transfer their allegiance from a union to which they were loyal to an-
other less well-established union which offered fewer advantages, and
faced with the prospect of forfeiture of their pensions, the railroad
men refused to join, so the local refused to load logs on the cars handled
by them. The resultant stoppage caused their unemployment for a
month and a half until they gave in and joined the local. In the mean-
time they were willing to work, and as long as it was available they
reported for work.
As in the Deep River case, a strike was called by a union local to
compel other persons to change their union affiliations. Yet in its sym-
pathy for the plight of the railroad men, the court did not follow the
rationale of the Deep River case. Over-ruling the determination of the
commissioner, the court held that claimants were eligible for benefits
as having met all the requirements of the relief provision. As in Andreas
v. Bates, participation in the stoppage was confused with participation
in the dispute which it brings about. Without explanation, it was held
that claimants had not participated in the labor dispute which was
admitted to exist. This left the paradox of the local as the sole party
to the controversy.
In holding that claimants were not "directly interested in" the dis-
pute, the court declared that this term is limited in its application "to
those employees directly interested in furtherance of the dispute by
participation and activity therein."'" The test of "direct interest" fol-
cessation of plant operations, yet would disqualify for only a limited period one who
quit without "good cause."
3 18 Wn. (2d) 206, 138 P. (2d) 876 (1943).
"Id. at 214, 222. Following this rationale in the subsequent Poison case, it was held
that claimants were "directly interested in the labor dispute, made so by the acts of their
designated bargaining agent. .. ."
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lowed by the weight of authority is whether the outcome of the dispute
stood to affect the terms of claimants' employment (wages, hours, con-
ditions, union security, union membership, etc.-all the points which
may be at issue either in the collective bargaining process or in some
other source of labor dispute)." In the Deep River case, claimants
were held to be directly interested, since the outcome would affect the
security and bargaining power of their own union. The use of this
objective standard--chance of gain or loss-is a far easier task of de-
termination than the criterion of mental or emotional interest.
The matter at stake in this controversy affected claimants vitally.
The outcome governed whether or not they were to have a voice in the
union which represented them as their bargaining agent, whether or
not they were to pay an initiation fee and monthly dues. The question
of union membership affects not only one's terms of employment but
also status and conditions of life as a union member and the degree to
which one has a voice in the organization which so deeply affects his
life. Consider the diversity of life as a working member of the ILWU,
ILGWU, or Teamsters.""
Since "participation" and "direct interest" are stated as separate
requirements in the relief provision, the inference is that there may be
interest where participation is absent."' This holding, that an employee
is not directly interested in the dispute unless he engages in participa-
tion and activity therein, nullifies the direct interest requirement, de-
spite the presumption that the legislature intended to give significance
to every word.
The purpose of the direct interest requirement is to establish the
coverage of the section where evidence of participation is conflicting
or scant. Under current conditions of industrial labor it is almost futile
to try to show what, by his own actions, an individual union member
55Accord, Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S.E. (2d) 863 (1941) ; Chrysler
Corp. v. Smith, note 46 supra; Chrysler Corp. v. App. Bd., note 46 mipra; Nobes v.
Michigan U.C.C., 313 Mich. 472, 21 N.W. (2d) 820 (1946) ; Auker v. Rev. Bd., note 38
supra; Kemiel v. Rev. Bd., 117 Ind. App. 357, 72 N.E. (2d) 238 (1947) ; State v.
Lunceford, 229 N.C. 570, 50 S.E. (2d) 497 (1948). Contra, Kieckhefer Container Co.
v. U. C. Comm., note 38 supra. By the chance of gain test of direct interest, where an
employer and another party are engaged in a labor dispute in reference to the estab-
ishment in question, as in Gazzam v. Bldg. Service Emnployees' Union, 29 Wn. (2d)
488, 188 P.(2d) 97 (1947), the employees fail to meet the exception even if they take
no part, since they are directly interested in the outcome, as the subject of the dispute
is their terms of employment or association. (In such an instance, there remains the
problem as to whether the stoppage is "because of' a labor dispute when the immediate
cause is a falling off of business.)56International Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union, International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.57 Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., note 46 supra.
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has done to promote or avert a labor dispute stoppage. The individual
can do little or nothing to manifest his wishes. From an evidentiary
standpoint, it is much more easy for direct interest to be shown. It
depends upon the issues of the dispute and is thus a more objective
standard than that of participation and a factor more simple to de-
termine. The direct interest requirement supplements that of partici-
pation and is the more important because of its broader scope and
easier proof. (And in the same way that direct interest backs up par-
ticipation, "grade or class" backs up direct interest.)
In Case No. 2 (the events of which preceded those of Case No. 1),
the local, as bargaining agent, struck for an improvement in terms of
employment. Claimant trainmen were unsympathetic and offered to
work. The strike resulted in concessions which accrued to all em-
ployees, including claimants. They were held to have met all require-
ments of the relief provision and thus to be eligible for benefits. The
chance of gain test was rejected, and the requirement of direct interest
was again submerged in that of participation. The two cases seem to
stand for the proposition that the state shall penalize those who take
part in the encouragement of industrial change, yet grant a subsidy
to those who stand pat."8
The most recent application of Section 77 was In re Employees
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,"9 the only case not concerned with
the logging and lumber industries. There was a strike at the premises
58 Separate Branch Proviso: The opinion uses the "separate branch" proviso ("....
Provided, That if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted
as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the
same premises, each such department -shall, for the purpose of this subdivision, be
deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises") at the end of
Section 77 as a definition of the term "factory, establishment or other premises" in the
initial statement of disqualification in the section (". . . the railroad department ... was
a separate branch of work... and thus to be deemed a separate establishment"). By
its position in the section and by the purpose of the other terms of the section, this
proviso seems intended to modify the grade or class provision immediately preceding it,
rather than the establishment provision. Since the implication of the relief provision is
that the disqualification extends to all who participate or are directly interested, such a
legislative intent is more likely than to have the proviso apply to establishment without
regard to the individual's participation, interest, grade, or class. The apparent function
of the separate branch proviso is to limit the extension of "class," to bound the area of
the phrase which otherwise tends to be extended indefinitely where there is an inte-
grated series of operations. This proviso might have been the controlling factor in
Case No. 2 if the local had been in a controversy over loggers' conditions only (so no
direct interest). Then the proviso might have served to put the employees of the rail-
road department beyond the limits of the class engaged in the dispute. Without the
proviso, the railroad workers, engaged in an integrated operation with the loggers so
that when one group stopped work the other was forced to stop, might have been
declared to be in the same class with the strikers. Washington was the first state to
embody this proviso in its labor dispute disqualification section. Since then most other
states have followed.
5 Note 19 supra.
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of the telephone company. Picket lines were maintained at the en-
trances, and claimant telephone operators did not cross them. They
were held to have failed to meet the requirements of the relief pro-
vision and thus to be ineligible for benefits.
In upholding the determination of the commissioner, the opinion
quoted with approval a passage from the decision in the Poison case:"0
We are of the opinion that the legislature deliberately failed to define
that term [labor dispute] for the reason that it realized that any attempt to
define that term might result in a definition which would not meet condi-
tions arising in the future. The legislature therefore left this question to be
determined by the commissioner.
It appears that the court is authorizing the legislature to delegate
its legislative discretion to an administrative officer. The meaning of
the term "labor dispute" is of the essence of the statute. A commis-
sioner who was hostile to the section by making up his own definition
of the phrase could contract it as far as the court has contracted the
meaning-of the same phrase under the state anti-injunction act." He
could do so even more easily, since no definition is provided as it is in
the anti-injunction act.
The legislature may define the term, or it may set up other standards
to be followed by the commissioner in his application of it. Judicial
review may determine whether the administrative decision has been
confined to the limits of the standard, but the commissioner, if he has
the power to expand or contract these limits, is exercising both legis-
lative and judicial functions, for he is in effect making substantive law
in deciding what cases come within the act or fall without it. He makes
his own definition, applies it, and determines whether his application
met his definition. For the court to say that the commissioner will work
out a definition in the course of his administrative decision is to abdi-
cate its own function.2
FoIn re Polson Lbr. & Shingle Mills, note 45 supra, at 662.61 Rm. REv. STAT. § 7612-13 (c) (Supp. 1939) [P.P.C. § 695-25c]. Safeway Stores
v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P.(2d) 372 (1935) ; Adams v. Bldg. Service
Employees' Etc. Union, 197 Wash. 242, 84 P.(2d) 1021 (1938) ; Fornili v. Auto Me-
chanics' Union, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422 (1939) ; United Union Brewing Co. v.
Beck, 200 Wn. 474, 93 P.(2d) 772 (1939); Bloedel Donovan Lbr. M.v. Int. Wood-
workers, 4 Wn. (2d) 62, 102 P.(2d) 270 (1940); Shively v. Garage Emps. L. U.
No. 44, 6 Wn. (2d) 560, 108 P.(2d) 354 (1940) ; Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor
Council, 27 Wn. (2d) 193, 177 P.(2d) 873, 170 A.L.R. 1082 (1947); Gazzam v.
Bldg. Service, Etc., note 55 .rupra; A. E. Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 133 Wash. Dec. 625, 207 P.(2d) 206 (1949); Pacific Navigation and Trading v.
National Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, 133 Wash. Dec. 653, 207 P.(2d)
221 (1949).
62 "The complete separation of governmental powers into the legislative, the execu-
tive, and the judicial is impossible. In order to cope effectively with many complex
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However, the section is not necessarily invalid for lack of a standard
for the meaning of the term labor dispute. A legislative intent may be
implied that the commissioner use as a guide the definitions of the
term given by the federal labor legislation.
The three major acts of national labor legislation-Norris-La-
Guardia, Wagner, and Taft-Hartley-as well as most of the state anti-
injunction acts, embody definitions of the phrase labor dispute which
in the latter two are identical and contain one word added to the defi-
nition of the earlier act.88 This consistency may imply a purpose to
make uniform this definition in federal law.
As one of the requirements of the Social Security Act, setting up
standards for state acts as conditions to the allowance of contribution
credits against the federal tax, the state laws must not deny benefits
to an otherwise eligible individual for his refusal to accept a job which
is vacant "due directly to a strike, lockout or other labor dispute ... ",
All the state laws have repeated this provision verbatim as an excep-
tion to their "suitable work" provision. 5 Since Congress did not define
the term labor dispute, the intent may be implied that it have the mean-
ing given in the above mentioned definitions. The same meaning would
apply to the phrase incorporated in the state acts as copied from the
Social Security Act. Then when the states did not provide a special
definition for its use in Section 77, the intent may be implied to use
the same definition as intended for Section 79, the "suitable work"
exceptions provision.
This rationale is given weight by precedent. Most American deci-
sions have tended to follow the broad limits of the definitions given by
the federal acts and the state anti-injunction acts."0 The one uniform
relations created by modem society, it is necessary to vest in administrative officials or
bodies powers partaking of any two or all of these functions. The legislature manifestly
cannot delegate the power to make purely substantive law, but may delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action dependent, provided it has enunciated a standard by which such adminis-
trative body must be guided." State ex rel Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 195 Wash.
636, 643, 81 P. (2d) 818 (1938) ; Wheeler School District v. Hawley, 18 Wn. (2d) 37,
47, 137 P.(2d) 1010 (1943) ; Schecter v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
68 "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure
[word "tenure" omitted in Norris-La Guardia Act definition] or conditions of employ-
ment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee." 47 STAT. 73, 29 U.S.C., 113 (1932) (Norris-La Guardia) ; 49 STAT. 450
(1935), 61 STAT. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 152 (9) (Wagner and Taft-Hartley).
6449 STAT. 640 (1935),26 U.S.C. 1603 (a) (5) (A) (1946).
Or Note 21 supra.
66 Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W. (2d) 929 (1940), cert. denied 314 U.S.
628 (Norris-LaGuardia definition followed); Dallas Fuel Co. v. Home, 230 Iowa
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exception has been that in unemployment compensation cases the term
has been applied only where the controversy involves a group of
employees."7 Other sections of the act are applied where there is a
dispute between an individual employee and his employer."8
CONCLUSION
One of the settled points appears to be that jurisdictional disputes
and lockouts, as well as economic strikes, constitute a labor dispute
within the meaning of the act; that active participation in either the
stoppage or the dispute is a condition of the existence of the relief pro-
vision's element of direct interest; that a failure to cross a picket line
is participation in the dispute regardless of the relationship of the
claimant to the issues of the dispute. Section 77 has been applied seven
times, four times in 1942 and 1943, when labor dispute stoppages were
looked upon with more disfavor than during peacetime. The treatment
by the court of the problems arising under this section cannot be pre-
dicted with certainty. As the lines of the past are blurred, so are those
of the future. But it can be expected that a concern for the equities
will be a dominant factor in each case.
It may be assumed that Section 77 was enacted in the light of the
public interest. Extension of coverage to labor dispute stoppages would
affect the public interest both by the consequences of the labor-man-
agement contest and increased payroll taxes to provide adequate re-
serves to cover the added risk. The competition for public funds, of
which payroll taxes are a source, is already keen, as exemplified by
the current struggle between pensions and schools. A plan of social
insurance cannot be considered as standing alone but must be taken
in its relation to other systems of public insurance-workmen's com-
pensation, old age pensions, survivors' and blind benefits, disability
insurance-and kept in balance with them.
1148, 300 N.W. 303 (1941), (Wagner Act definition followed); Miners in General
Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E. (2d) 810 (1941) (definitions given in the fed-
eral statutes followed as "persuasive") ; federal statutory definitions to be considered
by way of illustration but have no binding force and effect for this section, Ex Parte
Pesnell, 240 Ala. 457, 199 S. 726 (1940) ; Block Coal & Coke Co. v. UMW, 177 Tenn.
247, 148 S.W. (2d) 364 (1941) ; Dept. of Ind. Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala. App. 78,
1 S. (2d) 395, cert. denied 241 Ala. 142, 1 S. (2d) 402 (1941) (federal definitions held
not applicable-federal statutory definition inserted in state act immediately after this
decision) ; Badgett v. Dept. of Ind. Rel., note 40 s'upra (construction of statutory em-
bodiment of Wagner Act definition).
s7 Alabama, 26 CODE 1940, § 214A, expressly excludes it from application to a dispute
between an individual worker and his employer.
8 Note 6 supra.
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The state was faced with a choice-a stronger bargaining position
for management, coupled with the hardships stemming from loss of
wages with no benefits, or a stronger position for employees with less
hardship during the stoppage and a heavier burden of premium pay-
ments upon industry. Unjust results in specific cases are inevitable,
whether or not this risk is covered. The legislature has chosen the
former, on the ground that the secondary consequences of covering this
risk were sufficiently important incidents of the unemployment insur-
ance plan, and sufficiently against the public interest, that the scope
of the system should not be extended to cover it. Therefore the statu-
tory exception of this risk is to be applied.
Because the insurance coverage test follows the legislative intent
and the statutory terms with more precise obedience, because it
depends on objective criteria which are more susceptible of exact
determination, and which minimize value judgments, because it does
not call on the court to pass upon the merits of a dispute, and because
it operates on the assumption that public insurance coverage is a con-
tractual right rather than charity to the deserving poor, this test is the
most satisfactory standard which may be applied.
